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1 Introduction
Does debt financing affect a firm’s investment decisions? Under perfect capital market as-
sumptions, it is well-known from the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1958) that
corporate financing and investment decisions are independent and thus can be made sep-
arately. However, when market imperfections such as corporate taxes, bankruptcy costs,
and agency conflicts are introduced, the extant literature by and large establishes a linkage
between corporate financing and investment decisions such that they are no longer separa-
ble (see, e.g., Dotan and Ravid 1985; Dammon and Senbet 1988; Mauer and Triantis 1994;
Childs et al. 2005; De´camps and Djembissi 2007). In this paper, we use a real options
approach to examine how debt financing affects a firm’s investment decisions in general
and its investment intensity in particular, where optimal leverage is determined within a
standard trade-off model of capital structure a` la Leland (1994) and Goldstein et al. (2001).
Our real options model features an owner-managed firm that operates in continuous
time. The firm is initially endowed with a perpetual option to invest in a project at any time
by incurring an irreversible investment cost at that instant. The amount of the irreversible
investment cost determines the intensity of investment, which is a choice variable of the firm.
The project generates a stream of stochastic cash flows that follow a lognormal diffusion
process and increase with the intensity of investment, as in Capozza and Li (1994, 2002)
and Bar-Ilan and Strange (1999). The firm makes three decisions regarding the undertaking
of the project: the timing, intensity, and financing of investment.
The firm’s investment timing decision is characterized by a threshold (the investment
trigger) such that the project is undertaken at the first instant when the cash flow from
the project reaches the investment trigger from below (see, e.g., McDonald and Siegel 1986;
Dixit and Pindyck 1994). The firm’s investment intensity decision affects the amount of
the irreversible investment cost according to a known technology that exhibits decreasing
returns to scale. At the investment instant, the firm makes its financing decision by issuing
debt and equity, where the debt issued is perpetual with a constant coupon payment per
unit time. There is an exogenously given credit constraint that prohibits the firm’s debt-to-
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asset ratio from exceeding a prespecified threshold, which defines the firm’s debt capacity.
The firm chooses the optimal coupon payment so as to trade off the interest tax-shields
against the bankruptcy costs of debt. The firm also chooses the optimal time to default on
the debt obligation. Upon default, shareholders get nothing and debt holders receive the
liquidation value.
Within our real options model, we show that debt financing has no impact on the firm’s
optimal investment intensity, irrespective of whether the exogenously given credit constraint
is binding or not. In other words, the firm’s decision on investment intensity is completely
neutral to debt financing. To understand the intuition of this seemingly surprising result,
we consider a benchmark case wherein the firm is unlevered. In this benchmark case, the
unlevered firm chooses the optimal investment intensity that equates the value of the firm
per unit intensity of investment to the marginal cost of investment at the investment instant.
This is the usual optimality condition that the marginal return on investment is equal to
the marginal cost of investment at the optimum. On the other hand, the unlevered firm
chooses the optimal investment trigger taking into account the opportunity cost arising
from killing the investment option when the project is undertaken, which is captured by
the option value multiple (see Abel et al. 1996). The optimal investment trigger as such
equates the value of the firm at the investment instant to the investment cost augmented
by the option value multiple. Combining these two optimality conditions implies that the
optimal investment intensity is the one at which the marginal cost of investment is equal
to the average cost augmented by the option value multiple.1
When the firm is allowed to issue debt, the exogenously given credit constraint comes
into play. The binding credit constraint makes the project less valuable and thus reduces the
marginal return on investment. A higher level of investment intensity, on the other hand,
relaxes the credit constraint and thus lowers the marginal cost of investment. The binding
credit constraint also reduces the option value multiple, thereby making the net present
value of the project at the investment instant less than that when the credit constraint
does not bind. Since the adjustment to the option value multiple and that to the marginal
1Indeed, Wong (2009) shows that this optimality condition remains intact when the investment cost
becomes partially reversible.
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cost of investment are exactly the same (both of them come from the shadow price of the
binding credit constraint), the firm’s optimal investment intensity is ultimately determined
by the optimality condition that is identical to that in the benchmark case. That is, the
optimal investment intensity is the one that equates the marginal cost of investment to the
average cost augmented by the option value multiple, thereby rendering the neutrality of
debt in investment intensity within our real options model. We further show that debt is
not neutral to investment timing in general, and the levered firm invests earlier than the
unlevered firm in particular. The non-neutrality of debt in investment timing is due entirely
to the interest tax-shield benefits of debt, net of bankruptcy costs, which induce the levered
firm to accelerate the undertaking of the project as compared to the unlevered firm.
Our real options model is a direct extension of Belhaj and Djembissi (2007) by endoge-
nizing the intensity of investment. In the absence of the exogenously given credit constraint,
it is well-known from the real options literature on capital structure (see, e.g., Goldstein et
al. 2001; Strebulaev 2007; Tserlukevich 2008) that there is a scaling property in that the
optimal coupon payment as well as the values of debt and equity are all linear functions of
the cash flow at the investment instant, which in turn is linearly related to the irreversible
investment cost. The optimal investment intensity as such depends only on the character-
istics of the project, and not on the factors that determine the optimal capital structure,
thereby rendering the neutrality of debt in investment intensity. The binding credit con-
straint destroys the scaling property.2 On the one hand, the binding credit constraint lowers
the marginal cost of investment and thus tends to raise the investment intensity. On the
other hand, it also lowers the value of the levered firm at the investment instant and thus
tends to reduce the investment intensity. Our contribution is to show that these two op-
posing tendencies exactly offset each other as far as the investment intensity is concerned.
The neutrality of debt in investment intensity as such is not just an obvious consequence
of the scaling property.
Sabarwal (2005), like Belhaj and Djembissi (2007) and us, establishes the non-neutrality
2This can be easily seen from Eq. (37) that the net present value of the project at the investment instant
depends not only on the irreversible investment cost but also on the shadow price of the binding credit
constraint.
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of debt in investment timing. His results, however, are driven by agency conflicts and not by
corporate income taxes and bankruptcy costs. Specifically, Sabarwal (2005) assumes that
debt holders, taking the firm’s investment trigger as given, choose the coupon payment and
determine the value of debt such that they break even for an exogenously given amount of
debt financing. The firm, on the other hand, chooses the investment trigger so as to maxi-
mize the ex-ante equity value, taking the coupon payment selected by debt holders as given.
This gives rise to the well-known risk-shifting problem of Jensen and Meckling (1976) that
shareholders have incentives to increase the riskiness of the firm by investing earlier so as to
transfer wealth from debt holders to themselves. In the rational expectations equilibrium,
debt holders fully anticipate the risk shifting incentive of shareholders, and the optimal
investment trigger is shown to be a strictly decreasing function of the debt-to-asset ratio
due to the agency conflicts. In contrast, we show numerically that the optimal investment
trigger in our real options model without any agency conflicts is non-monotonically related
to the debt-to-asset ratio. While the interest tax-shield benefits of debt encourage early
investment, the bankruptcy costs of debt deter the investment incentive. The former effect
dominates (is dominated by) the latter effect for low (high) debt-to-asset ratios, thereby
rendering a U-shaped pattern of the optimal investment trigger against the debt-to-asset
ratio (see also Belhaj and Djembissi 2007).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 delineates our continuous-time
model of an owner-managed firm that has a perpetual option to invest in a project under
uncertainty. The firm has to make three decisions: the timing, intensity, and financing of
its investment. Section 3 derives the values of debt and equity of the levered firm at the
investment instant. Section 4 examines the optimal timing and intensity of investment in the
benchmark case of all-equity financing. Section 5 characterizes the optimal investment and
financing decisions of the firm in the absence of any exogenous credit constraints. Section
6 imposes onto the firm an exogenously given credit constraint that prohibits the firm from
having a debt-to-asset ratio above a prespecified threshold. We analytically characterize the
optimal investment and financing decisions of the firm, and numerically demonstrate the
significance of the credit constraint on the behavior of the firm. The final section concludes.
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2 The model
Consider a risk-neutral, owner-managed firm that has monopoly access to a perpetual option
to invest in a project.3 The firm is infinitely lived and operates in continuous time, where
time is indexed by t ∈ [0,∞). The firm is subject to a symmetric corporate income tax
system with full loss-offset provisions and a constant tax rate, τ ∈ (0, 1). The default-free
term structure is flat with a known instantaneous rate of interest, r > 0.
The firm makes three decisions regarding the undertaking of the project: the timing,
intensity, and financing of investment. The firm’s investment intensity, q ≥ 0, affects the
stream of stochastic earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT), {qXt : t ≥ 0}, generated
from the project, where Xt > 0 is a state variable specifying the project’s EBIT at time t
per unit intensity of investment. The stochastic process, {Xt : t ≥ 0}, is governed by the
following geometric Brownian motion:
dXt = µXt dt+ σXt dZt, (1)
where µ < r and σ > 0 are constant parameters, and dZt is the increment of a standard
Wiener process under the risk-neutral probability space, (Ω,F ,Q).4 Eq. (1) implies that
the growth rate of Xt is normally distributed with a mean, µ∆t, and a variance, σ
2∆t, over
a time interval, ∆t. The initial value of the state variable, X0 > 0, is known at t = 0.
To undertake the project at endogenously chosen time, t ≥ 0, and intensity, q ≥ 0, the
firm has to incur an irreversible investment cost, I(q), at that instant, where I(0) ≥ 0,
I ′(0) = 0, and I ′(q) > 0 and I ′′(q) > 0 for all q > 0.5 We further assume that the elasticity
of the investment cost with respect to the intensity of investment, qI ′(q)/I(q), is strictly
increasing in q.6 It is well known that finding the optimal time to invest in the project
is tantamount to finding a threshold value, XI , of the state variable, Xt, such that the
3The assumption of risk neutrality is innocuous as long as there are arbitrage-free and complete financial
markets in which assets can be traded to span the state variable that determines the value of the firm.
4The assumption that µ < r is needed to ensure that the value of the firm is finite.
5We allow for I(0) > 0 to account for some fixed set-up costs that are required to initiate the project.
The strict convexity of I(q) implies that the project exhibits decreasing returns to scale.
6I would like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this technical condition on I(q), which
ensures a unique maximum solution to the investment intensity.
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firm optimally exercises the investment option at the first instant when Xt reaches XI from
below (see, e.g., McDonald and Siegel 1986; Dixit and Pindyck 1994). We refer toXI as the
investment trigger, which is a choice variable of the firm. Let TI = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt = XI} be
the (random) first passage time of the state variable, Xt, to reach the investment trigger,
XI , from below, starting off at t = 0.
At the investment instant, TI , the firm can issue debt and equity to finance the invest-
ment cost, I(q), albeit subject to an exogenously given credit constraint. As in Belhaj and
Djembissi (2007), the firm is prohibited from having a debt-to-asset ratio that exceeds a
prespecified level, δ ∈ [0, 1]. We refer to δ as the firm’s debt capacity. In the extreme case
that δ = 0, the firm is restricted to be all-equity financed. The debt issued by the firm is
perpetual in that debt holders receive a constant coupon payment, C ≥ 0, per unit time
until default occurs, where C is a choice variable of the firm. The coupon payments to debt
holders are tax-deductible so that the interest tax-shield is τC per unit time.
Shareholders have limited liability and thus the option to default on their debt obliga-
tions. The optimal policy for shareholders is to default at the first instant when the value
of equity vanishes, which is equivalent to solving the default trigger, XD, at which the value
of equity vanishes as the state variable, Xt, reaches XD the first time from above (see, e.g.,
Leland 1994; Goldstein et al. 2001; Morellec 2001).7 Let TD = inf{t ≥ TI : Xt = XD} be
the (random) first passage time at which the default trigger, XD, is reached from above,
starting off at the investment instant, TI.
At the default instant, TD, the firm is immediately liquidated and absolute priority is
enforced. Following Mello and Parsons (1992) and Morellec (2001), we assume that, after
default, the new owners continue to employ the asset in its current use to yield the unlevered
value, V U(q, XD):
V U (q, XD) = E
XD
Q
[ ∫ ∞
TD
e−r(t−TD)(1− τ)qXt dt
]
= (1− τ)
(
qXD
r − µ
)
, (2)
where EXDQ (·) is the expectation operator with respect to the risk-neutral probability mea-
7This stock-based definition of default implies that it is optimal for shareholders to inject capital in the
firm as long as the firm has positive economic net worth, and that the firm is insolvent on a flow basis at
the default instant.
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sure, Q, conditional on XD. The liquidation value of the firm at the default instant, TD,
is then given by (1− b)V U(q, XD), where b ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter gauging the severity of
bankruptcy costs.8 Since absolute priority is enforced, shareholders get nothing and debt
holders receive the liquidation value upon default.
We summarize the firm’s investment and financing decisions by a triple, (q, XI, C), that
specifies the investment intensity, q, the investment trigger, XI, and the coupon payment,
C. The firm chooses the triple, (q, XI, C), so as to maximize the ex-ante value of equity prior
to the debt issuance, subject to the exogenously given credit constraint. Specifically, at the
investment instant, TI , the firm issues perpetual debt to raiseD(q, XI, C) from debt holders,
where D(q, XI, C) ≤ δI(q). The difference, I(q)−D(q, XI, C) ≥ (1− δ)I(q), is raised from
shareholders whose claim right after the debt issuance is worth E(q, XI, C). The ex-ante
value of equity is therefore given by E(q, XI, C)− [I(q)−D(q, XI, C)] = V (q, XI, C)−I(q),
where V (q, XI, C) = D(q, XI, C) + E(q, XI, C) is the value of the firm at the investment
instant, TI . Hence, maximizing the ex-ante value of equity is tantamount to maximizing
the net present value of the project.
3 Valuation of corporate securities
In this section, we derive the values of debt and equity at the investment instant, TI,
taking the firm’s investment and financing decisions, (q, XI, C), as given. That is, we derive
D(q, XI, C) and E(q, XI, C), where q > 0, XI > X0, and C ≥ 0 are all fixed.
The value of equity at the investment instant, TI , is given by
E(q, XI, C) = E
XI
Q
[ ∫ TD
TI
e−r(t−TI )(1− τ)(qXt − C) dt
]
, (3)
where TD is the default instant at which the state variable, Xt, reaches the optimal default
trigger, XD(q, C), from above, and E
XI
Q (·) is the expectation operator with respect to the
8Even when b = 0, the firm will not entirely finance by issuing debt. Too much leverage risks bankruptcy
with the concomitant losses of the tax deductibility of coupon payments, thereby imposing limits on the
usage of debt in the absence of bankruptcy costs (see Brennan and Schwartz 1978; Leland 1994).
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risk-neutral probability measure, Q, conditional on XI . Rewrite Eq. (3) as
E(q, XI, C) = (1− τ)
(
qXI
r − µ
−
C
r
)
+ EXIQ
[ ∫ ∞
TD
e−r(t−TI )(1− τ)(C − qXt) dt
]
. (4)
Using the strong Markov property of Ito diffusions, we can write the second term on the
right-hand side of Eq. (4) as
EXIQ
[
e−r(TD−TI)
]
E
XD(q,C)
Q
[ ∫ ∞
TD
e−r(t−TD)(1− τ)(C − qXt) dt
]
, (5)
where E
XD(q,C)
Q (·) is the expectation operator with respect to the risk-neutral probability
measure, Q, conditional on XD(q, C). It is well-known (see, e.g., Karatzas and Shreve 1988;
Dixit and Pindyck 1994) that
EXIQ
[
e−r(TD−TI)
]
=
[
XD(q, C)
XI
]α
, (6)
if XI > XD(q, C), where α = µ/σ
2 − 1/2 +
√
(µ/σ2 − 1/2)2 + 2r/σ2 > 0. Substituting
expression (5) and Eq. (6) into Eq. (4) yields
E(q, XI, C) = V
U (q, XI)− (1− τ)
C
r
+
{
(1− τ)
C
r
− V U [q, XD(q, C)]
}[
XD(q, C)
XI
]α
, (7)
where V U (q, XI) is defined in Eq. (2) with XD replaced by XI and TD replaced by TI . The
last term on the right-hand side of Eq. (7) is the value of the default option. Differentiating
Eq. (7) with respect to XD(q, C) and solving the first-order condition yields the optimal
default trigger:
XD(q, C) =
(
r − µ
q
)(
α
α + 1
)
C
r
. (8)
It is evident from Eq. (8) that 0 < qXD(q, C) < C if C > 0, i.e., the firm is insolvent on a
flow basis at the default instant (see also Leland 1994; Goldstein et al. 2001; Morellec 2001).
If C = 0, it follows from Eqs. (7) and (8) that XD(q, 0) = 0 and E(q, XI, 0) = V
U(q, XI).
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The value of debt at the investment instant, TI , is given by
D(q, XI, C) = E
XI
Q
{∫ TD
TI
e−r(t−TI )C dt+ e−r(TD−TI )(1− b)V U [q, XD(q, C)]
}
, (9)
where V U [q, XD(q, C)] and XD(q, C) are given by Eqs. (2) and (8), respectively. Rewrite
Eq. (9) as
D(q, XI, C) =
C
r
− EXIQ
[
e−r(TD−TI)
]{
C
r
− (1− b)V U [q, XD(q, C)]
}
, (10)
where the second term on the right-hand side of Eq. (10) follows from the strong Markov
property of Ito diffusions. Substituting Eq. (6) into Eq. (10) and rearranging terms yields
D(q, XI, C) =
C
r
{
1− τ
[
XD(q, C)
XI
]α}
−
{
(1− τ)
C
r
− V U [q, XD(q, C)]
}[
XD(q, C)
XI
]α
−bV U [q, XD(q, C)]
[
XD(q, C)
XI
]α
. (11)
The first term on the right-hand side of Eq. (11) is the value of the coupon payments net
of the forgone interest tax-shield benefits due to default. The second term is the value of
the default option that is given to shareholders. The last term is the value of bankruptcy
costs. If C = 0, it follows from Eqs. (8) and (11) that D(q, XI, 0) = 0.
For all C > 0, the value of the levered firm at the investment instant, V (q, XI, C), is
given by the sum of the value of debt, D(q, XI, C), and the value of equity, E(q, XI, C).
Using Eqs. (7) and (11), we have
V (q, XI, C) = V
U(q, XI) +
τC
r
{
1−
[
XD(q, C)
XI
]α}
−bV U [q, XD(q, C)]
[
XD(q, C)
XI
]α
, (12)
where V U(q, XI) is defined in Eq. (2) with XD replaced by XI and TD replaced by TI , and
XD(q, C) is given by Eq. (8). The first term on the right-hand side of Eq. (12) is the value
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of the firm should it be unlevered. The second term is the value of the interest tax-shield
benefits of debt. The last term is the value of bankruptcy costs.
4 Benchmark case of all-equity financing
In this section, we consider a benchmark wherein the firm is restricted to finance the project
solely with equity. This is the case when the firm has zero debt capacity, i.e., δ = 0. This
is also the case studied by Capozza and Li (1994, 2002) and Bar-Ilan and Strange (1999).
The value of the unlevered firm at t = 0 is given by
FU (X0) = max
q>0,XI>X0
EX0Q
{
e−rTI [V U (q, XI)− I(q)]
}
, (13)
where TI is the investment instant, E
X0
Q (·) is the expectation operator with respect to the
risk-neutral probability measure, Q, conditional on X0, and V
U(q, XI) is defined in Eq. (2)
with XD replaced by XI and TD replaced by TI . It is well-known (see, e.g., Karatzas and
Shreve 1988; Dixit and Pindyck 1994) that
EX0Q
(
e−rTI
)
=
(
X0
XI
)β
, (14)
if XI > X0, where β = 1/2− µ/σ
2 +
√
(µ/σ2 − 1/2)2+ 2r/σ2 > 1. Substituting Eqs. (2)
and (14) into Eq. (13) yields
FU (X0) = max
q>0,XI>X0
[
(1− τ)
(
qXI
r − µ
)
− I(q)
](
X0
XI
)β
. (15)
The first-order conditions for the optimization problem on the right-hand side of Eq. (15)
are given by
(1− τ)
(
XUI
r − µ
)
= I ′(qU), (16)
and
(1− τ)
(
qUXUI
r− µ
)
=
(
β
β − 1
)
I(qU), (17)
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where qU and XUI are the optimal investment intensity and trigger of the unlevered firm,
respectively.
Solving Eqs. (16) and (17) yields our first proposition.
Proposition 1 The unlevered firm’s optimal investment intensity, qU , is the unique solu-
tion to
I ′(qU) =
(
β
β − 1
)
I(qU)
qU
, (18)
and the unlevered firm’s optimal investment trigger, XUI , is given by
XUI =
(
r − µ
1− τ
)(
β
β − 1
)
I(qU)
qU
. (19)
Proof Dividing Eq. (17) by qU and substituting the resulting equation into Eq. (16) yields
Eq. (18). The uniqueness of qU follows from the fact that qI ′(q)/I(q) is strictly increasing
in q. Rearranging terms of Eq. (17) yields Eq. (19). 2
To see the intuition of Proposition 1, we use Eq. (2) to write Eqs. (16) and (17) as
V U (qU , XUI )
qU
= I ′(qU), (20)
and
V U (qU , XUI )− I(q
U) =
(
β
β − 1
− 1
)
I(qU), (21)
respectively. Eq. (20) states that the optimal investment intensity, qU , equates the value of
the unlevered firm per unit intensity of investment, V U (qU , XUI )/q
U , to the marginal cost
of investment, I ′(qU ), at the investment instant. The literature on irreversible investment
under uncertainty refers to the expression, β/(β − 1) > 1, as the option value multiple (see
Abel et al. 1996). It measures the wedge between the value of the project at the investment
instant, V U (qU , XUI ), and the investment cost, I(q
U), which captures the opportunity cost
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arising from killing the investment option when the project is undertaken, as is evident
from Eq. (21). Combining Eqs. (20) and (21) yields Eq. (18). That is, at the optimal
investment intensity, qU , the marginal cost of investment, I ′(qU), is equal to the average
cost, I(qU)/qU , augmented by the option value multiple, β/(β − 1).
5 The case of no exogenous credit constraints
In this section, we consider the case that the exogenously given credit constraint does not
exist. In this case, the firm issues perpetual debt to raise D(q, XI, C) from debt holders
at the investment instant, TI . The difference, I(q)−D(q, XI, C), is raised from (paid to if
negative) shareholders. The ex-ante value of equity prior to the debt issuance is therefore
given by E(q, XI, C)− [I(q)−D(q, XI, C)] = V (q, XI, C)− I(q).
The value of the levered firm at t = 0 is given by
F (X0) = max
q>0,XI>X0,C≥0
EX0Q
{
e−rTI [V (q, XI, C)− I(q)]
}
, (22)
where EX0Q (·) is the expectation operator with respect to the risk-neutral probability mea-
sure, Q, conditional on X0, and V (q, XI, C) is defined in Eq. (12). Substituting Eqs. (2),
(8), (12), and (14) into Eq. (22) yields
F (X0) = max
q>0,XI>X0,C≥0
{
(1− τ)
(
qXI
r − µ
)
+
τC
r
−
[
τ + b(1− τ)
(
α
α + 1
)]
×
(
α
α+ 1
)α(r − µ
qXI
)α(C
r
)α+1
− I(q)
}(
X0
XI
)β
. (23)
We solve the optimization problem on the right-hand side of Eq. (23) in two steps. First, we
derive the optimal coupon payment, C(q, XI), for a given pair of q > 0 and XI > X0. Then,
we derive the optimal investment intensity and trigger, qL and XLI , taking the schedule of
the optimal coupon payments, C(q, XI), as given. The solution to the optimization problem
on the right-hand side of Eq. (23) is therefore given by qL, XLI , and C
L = C(qL, XLI ).
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For a given pair of q > 0 and XI > X0, the first-order condition for the optimization
problem on the right-hand side of Eq. (23) is given by
τ − [τ(α+ 1) + b(1− τ)α]
(
α
α+ 1
)α(r − µ
qXI
)α[C(qXI)
r
]α
= 0, (24)
where C(qXI) is the optimal coupon payment, which, from Eq. (24), is a function of the
EBIT at the investment instant, qXI . Solving Eq. (24) for C(qXI) yields
C(qXI) = rφ
(
α + 1
α
)(
qXI
r − µ
)
. (25)
where φ = {τ/[τ(α+ 1) + b(1− τ)α]}1/α ∈ (0, 1). Substituting Eqs. (24) and (25) into the
right-hand side of Eq. (23) yields
F (X0) = max
q>0,XI>X0
{
[1− τ(1− φ)]
(
qXI
r − µ
)
− I(q)
}(
X0
XI
)β
. (26)
Inspection of Eqs. (15) and (26) reveals that the effect of the optimal leverage on firm value,
i.e., F (X0)−F
U (X0), is equivalent to that of a reduction in the corporate income tax rate
from τ to τ(1− φ) on the value of the unlevered firm. The following proposition is thus an
immediate consequence of Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 If the exogenously given credit constraint does not exist, the optimal in-
vestment intensity of the levered firm, qL, is identical to that of the unlevered firm, qU .
Furthermore, the optimal investment trigger of the levered firm, XLI , is given by
XLI =
[
r − µ
1− τ(1− φ)
](
β
β − 1
)
I(qL)
qL
, (27)
which is strictly less than that of the unlevered firm, XUI , the optimal coupon payment of
the levered firm, CL, is given by
CL =
[
rφ
1− τ(1− φ)
](
α + 1
α
)(
β
β − 1
)
I(qL), (28)
and the optimal debt-to-asset ratio of the levered firm, δL, is given by
δL =
[
φ
1− τ(1− φ)
][
τ(α+ 2− τ) + b(1− τ)(α+ 1− τ)
τ(α+ 1) + b(1− τ)α
](
β
β − 1
)
, (29)
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where φ = {τ/[τ(α+ 1) + b(1− τ)α]}1/α ∈ (0, 1).
Proof Using Eqs. (15) and (26), we apply the results in Proposition 1 to get qL = qU and
Eq. (27). Substituting Eq. (27) into Eq. (25) yields Eq. (28). Substituting Eqs. (2), (8),
(27), and (28) into Eq. (11) yields D(qL, XLI , C
L) = δLI(qL), where δL is defined in Eq.
(29). 2
The intuition of Proposition 2 is as follows. It is evident from Eq. (24) that the schedule
of the optimal coupon payments, C(qXI), is linear in the EBIT at the investment instant,
qXI . The values of equity and debt, evaluated at C(qXI), are thus also linear in qXI, as
is evident from Eqs. (7) and (11). This is referred to as the scaling property in the real
options literature on capital structure (see, e.g., Goldstein et al. 2001; Strebulaev 2007;
Tserlukevich 2008). As is shown on the right-hand side of Eq. (26), the value of the interest
tax-shield benefits of debt, net of bankruptcy costs, is equal to τφqXI/(r − µ), which is
tantamount to the case of a reduction in the corporate income tax rate from τ to τ(1− φ)
faced by the unlevered firm (see also Belhaj and Djembissi 2007). From Proposition 1, we
know that reducing the corporate income tax rate has no effect on the unlevered firm’s
optimal investment intensity, qU , but decreases its optimal investment trigger, XUI , thereby
invoking Proposition 2.
Substituting Eq. (27) into the expression inside the curly brackets on the right-hand
side of Eq. (26) yields
V (qL, XLI , C
L)− I(qL) =
(
β
β − 1
− 1
)
I(qL). (30)
Since qU = qL, it follows from Eqs. (21) and (30) that the net present value of the unlevered
project at the investment instant, TUI = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt = X
U
I }, is exactly equal to that of
the levered project at the investment instant, TLI = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt = X
L
I }. Using Eqs. (15)
and (26) and Propositions 1 and 2, we have
F (X0)− F
U (X0) =
{[
1− τ(1− φ)
1− τ
]β
− 1
}
FU (X0) > 0. (31)
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That is, the value of the levered firm at t = 0, F (X0), exceeds that of the unlevered firm,
FU (X0), by the value of the interest tax-shield benefits of debt (net of bankruptcy costs),
which is given by the right-hand side of Eq. (31). These results are the same as the findings
in Belhaj and Djembissi (2007).
While debt is neutral to the intensity of investment, it is not neutral to the timing of
investment, as is shown in Proposition 2.9 Such non-neutrality of debt in investment timing
is due entirely to the interest tax-shield benefits of debt, net of bankruptcy costs, which
induce the levered firm to accelerate the undertaking of the project as compared to the
unlevered firm. Indeed, in the absence of corporate income taxes and bankruptcy costs,
i.e., τ = b = 0, it follows from Eqs. (19) and (27) that XUI = X
L
I , thereby rendering the
Modigliani-Miller theorem.
Unlike us, Sabarwal (2005) establishes the non-neutrality of debt in investment timing
without relying on corporate income taxes and bankruptcy costs.10 His results are driven by
agency conflicts. Specifically, Sabarwal (2005) assumes that debt holders, taking the firm’s
investment trigger as given, choose the coupon payment and determine the value of debt
such that they break even in their investment. The firm, on the other hand, chooses the
investment trigger so as to maximize the ex-ante equity value, taking the coupon payment
selected by debt holders as given. For an exogenously given amount of debt financing, the
perpetual debt contract is correctly priced by rational expectations in equilibrium. To see
how Sabarwal’s (2005) assumptions affect our results, we fix the investment intensity at qL,
and suppose that debt holders naively believe that the firm would choose the investment
trigger XLI , given by Eq. (27). Debt holders as such demand the coupon payment, C
L,
given by Eq. (28), and pay the amount, D(qL, XLI , C
L) = δLI(qL), to the firm, where δL is
defined in Eq. (29). The firm then chooses the investment trigger, XI, so as to maximize
9It is well known (see, e.g., Sarkar 2000; Shackleton and Wojakowski 2002; Wong 2007, 2008; Thijssen
2009) that the expected time to exercise the investment option (the investment timing) is given by EX0Q (TI) =
ln(XI/X0)/(µ− σ
2/2), whenever µ > σ2/2. Hence, the investment trigger and the investment timing are
positively related.
10The real options model of Sabarwal (2005) is a straightforward extension of Pindyck (1988, 1991).
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the ex-ante value of equity:
max
XI>X0
EX0Q
{
e−rTI{E(qL, XI, C
L)− [I(qL)−D(qL, XLI , C
L)]}
}
= max
XI>X0
[V (qL, XI, C
L)− I(qL)]
(
X0
XI
)β
+[D(qL, XLI , C
L)−D(qL, XI, C
L)]
(
X0
XI
)β
, (32)
where we have used Eq. (14) and V (qL, XI, C
L) = D(qL, XI, C
L) +E(qL, XI, C
L). Differ-
entiating the right-hand side of Eq. (32) with respect to XI , and evaluating the resulting
derivative at XI = X
L
I yields
−
∂D(qL, XI, C
L)
∂XI
∣∣∣∣
XI=X
L
I
(
X0
XLI
)β
= −
α
XLI
[
CL
r
−D(qL, XLI , C
L)
](
X0
XLI
)β
< 0, (33)
where we have used the fact that XLI is the investment trigger that maximizes the value of
the levered firm, i.e., the first term on the right-hand side of Eq. (32). Eq. (33) implies
that the firm has incentives to lower the investment trigger from XLI so as to reduce the
value of debt from D(qL, XLI , C
L). This is the well-known risk-shifting problem of Jensen
and Meckling (1976) that shareholders have incentives to increase the riskiness of the firm
(in our case to invest in the project earlier) so as to transfer wealth from debt holders
to themselves. Debt holders are, of course, rational and fully anticipate the risk-shifting
problem. In the rational expectations equilibrium, debt holders break even and the firm
chooses the optimal investment trigger that is less than XLI .
11
6 The case of exogenous credit constraints
In this section, we resume the original case that the exogenously given credit constraint,
D(q, XI, C) ≤ δI(q), prevails, where δ ∈ (0, 1] is the maximum debt-to-asset ratio. In this
11See Mauer and Sarkar (2005) for the complete analysis that incorporates both the agency and trade-off
considerations.
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case, the value of the firm at t = 0 is given by
F (X0) = max
q>0,XI>X0,C≥0
EX0Q
{
e−rTI [V (q, XI, C)− I(q)]
}
s.t. D(q, XI, C) ≤ δI(q), (34)
where TI is the (random) investment instant, E
X0
Q (·) is the expectation operator with re-
spect to the risk-neutral probability measure, Q, conditional on X0, and D(q, XI, C) and
V (q, XI, C) are defined in Eqs. (11) and (12), respectively.
We form the Lagrangian for the optimization problem on the right-hand side of Eq.
(34):
L =
{
(1− τ)
(
qXI
r − µ
)
+
τC
r
−
[
τ + b(1− τ)
(
α
α + 1
)]
×
(
α
α+ 1
)α(r − µ
qXI
)α(C
r
)α+1
− I(q)
}(
X0
XI
)β
+ λ
{
δI(q)−
C
r
+
[
1− (1− b)(1− τ)
(
α
α+ 1
)](
α
α+ 1
)α(r − µ
qXI
)α(C
r
)α+1}
, (35)
where we have substituted Eqs. (2), (8), (11), (12), and (14) into Eq. (34), and λ ≥ 0
is the Lagrange multiplier to the exogenous credit constraint, D(q, XI, C) ≤ δI(q). Let
(qL, XLI , C
L) be the solution to the optimization problem on the right-hand side of Eq.
(34), and λL ≥ 0 be the optimal Lagrange multiplier.
Solving the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the Lagrangian in Eq. (35) yields the following
proposition.
Proposition 3 Irrespective of whether the exogenously given credit constraint is binding
or not, the optimal investment intensity of the levered firm, qL, is identical to that of the
unlevered firm, qU . Furthermore, the optimal investment trigger of the levered firm, XLI , is
strictly less than that of the unlevered firm, XUI .
Proof See Appendix A. 2
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The intuition of Proposition 3 is as follows. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the La-
grangian in Eq. (35) imply the following pair of optimality conditions (see Appendix A for
the derivation):
V (qL, XLI , C
L)
qL
− λLδ
(
XLI
X0
)β I(qL)
qL
=
[
1− λLδ
(
XLI
X0
)β]
I ′(qL), (36)
and
V (qL, XLI , C
L)− I(qL) =
[
1− λLδ
(
XLI
X0
)β]( β
β − 1
− 1
)
I(qL). (37)
When λL = 0, the exogenously given credit constraint does not bind at the optimum so that
Proposition 2 holds. Indeed, Eqs. (36) and (37) with λL = 0 reduce to Eqs. (20) and (21)
in the benchmark case of all-equity financing. The more interesting case is the one in which
the exogenously given credit constraint is binding at the optimum so that λL > 0. This is
the case when 0 < δ < δL, where δL is defined in Eq. (29). Inspection of Eqs. (36) and (37)
reveals that we need to take into account the shadow price of the binding credit constraint,
i.e., λLδ(XLI /X0)
β > 0. The binding credit constraint makes the project less valuable and
thus reduces the marginal return on investment by an amount, λLδ(XLI /X0)
βI(qL)/qL, as is
evident from the left-hand side of Eq. (36). On the other hand, a higher level of investment
intensity relaxes the credit constraint and thus lowers the marginal cost of investment by
the fraction, λLδ(XLI /X0)
β, as is shown on the right-hand side of Eq. (36). Eq. (37)
implies that the binding credit constraint reduces the option value multiple by the same
fraction, λLδ(XLI /X0)
β . The net present value of the project at the investment instant,
V (qL, XLI , C
L)− I(qL), is therefore less than that under the non-binding credit constraint,
which is equal to that with all-equity financing.12 Since the adjustment to the option value
multiple and that to the marginal cost of investment are exactly the same and given by the
fraction, λLδ(XLI /X0)
β, the firm’s optimal investment intensity is ultimately determined by
the optimality condition identical to that in the benchmark case.13 That is, at the optimal
12Indeed, Belhaj and Djembissi (2007) offer a numerical example that shows a U-shaped pattern of the
value of the levered firm at the investment instant against the debt capacity, δ, which is consistent with our
results. See also Table 1.
13Of course, if the the adjustment to the option value multiple and that to the marginal cost of investment
are not the same, which may be the case for some variant models of ours (see, e.g., Sarkar and Zapatero
2003; Sarkar 2008; Wong and Wu 2009), debt is no longer neutral to investment intensity.
K. P. Wong 20
investment intensity, qL, the marginal cost of investment, I ′(qL), is equal to the average
cost, I(qL)/qL, augmented by the option value multiple, β/(β − 1). Proposition 3 thus
extends the neutrality of debt in investment intensity, as is shown in Proposition 2, to the
more general case of exogenous credit constraints within our real options model.
Using Eqs. (15), (34), and (37) and Propositions 1 and 3, we have
F (X0)− F
U (X0) =
[(
XUI
XLI
)β
− 1− λLδ
(
XUI
X0
)β]
FU (X0), (38)
where the right-hand side of Eq. (38) is the value of the interest tax-shield benefits of debt
net of bankruptcy costs. When the exogenously given credit constraint does not bind at
the optimum, i.e., δ ≥ δL, we have λL = 0 so that Eq. (38) reduces to Eq. (31). In the
case that 0 < δ < δL, it is clear from the fact that the optimal choice of the unlevered firm
is feasible to, but is not chosen by, the levered firm (XLI < X
U
I from Proposition 3) so that
F (X0) > F
U (X0).
To gain more insight into how the severity of the exogenously given credit constraint
affects the levered firm, we conduct the following numerical analysis with respect to different
values of the debt capacity, δ ∈ [0, 1]. We set the investment cost function, I(q) = 10 + q4,
the annualized riskless rate of interest, r = 8%, the corporate income tax rate, τ = 15%,
and the bankruptcy cost parameter, b = 30%. The state variable, Xt, takes on the initial
value, X0 = 1, with the annualized growth rate, µ = 2%, and the annualized standard
deviation, σ = 30%. Table 1 reports our numerical results.
(Insert Table 1 here)
The first row in Table 1 gives the optimal investment intensity and investment trigger
of the unlevered firm, qU = 2.0551 and XUI = 2.4508, respectively. The value of the
unlevered firm at t = 0 is FU (X0) = 10.006, and the net present value of the unlevered
project at the investment instant is V U (qU , XUI ) − I(q
U) = 43.517. When the firm is
allowed to have positive debt capacity, i.e., δ ∈ (0, 1], the optimal investment intensity of
the levered firm remains unchanged and equal to qL = 2.0551. The exogenously given credit
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constraint is always binding at the optimum for all δ ∈ (0, 1] such that the optimal coupon
payment, CL, and the value of the levered firm, F (X0), are both strictly increasing in δ.
14
The last row in Table 1 reports the numerical solution to the case of no exogenous credit
constraints. In this unconstrained scenario, the optimal debt-to-asset ratio is δL = 1.2885
and the value of the levered firm is the highest, F (X0) = 10.839. Table 1 shows that
both the optimal investment trigger, XLI , and the net present value of the project at the
investment instant, V (qL, XLI , C
L) − I(qL), exhibit U-shaped patterns against the debt
capacity, δ, such that the former reaches a minimum at δ = 0.9 while the latter reaches
a minimum at δ = 0.7. Table 1 also shows that XLI < X
U
I = 2.4508, which is consistent
with the results in Propositions 2 and 3. Relaxing the severity of the exogenously given
credit constraint (i.e., increasing the debt capacity, δ) does not always hasten investment by
lowering the investment trigger, particularly when δ is sufficiently high. While the interest
tax-shield benefits of debt encourage early investment, the bankruptcy costs of debt deter
the investment incentive. The former effect on the investment trigger, XLI , dominates (is
dominated by) the latter effect for low (high) values of δ, thereby rendering the U-shaped
pattern of XLI against δ. These results are consistent with the findings in Belhaj and
Djembissi (2007).
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined the interaction between investment and financing decisions
of an owner-managed firm using a real options approach. The firm is endowed with a
perpetual option to invest in a project at any time by incurring an irreversible investment
cost at that instant. The amount of the irreversible investment cost determines the intensity
of investment with decreasing returns to scale. The project generates a stream of cash
flows that is stochastic over time and increases with the intensity of investment. The firm
can finance the project by issuing debt and equity, albeit subject to an exogenously given
14Belhaj and Djembissi (2007) use a much smaller value of the annualized standard deviation, σ = 5%.
In their numerical example, the optimal debt-to-asset ratio in the unconstrained case is δL = 0.96 so that
the exogenously given credit constraint does not bind at the optimum for all δ ∈ [0.96, 1].
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credit constraint that prohibits the firm’s debt-to-asset ratio from exceeding a prespecified
threshold. The optimal capital structure of the firm is determined by the trade-off between
interest tax-shield benefits and bankruptcy costs of debt.
Within our real options model, we have established the neutrality of debt in investment
intensity. Irrespective of whether the exogenously given credit constraint is binding or not,
we have shown that debt financing does not affect the firm’s optimal investment intensity.
Debt financing, however, has real effect on investment timing. Specifically, the optimal
investment trigger of the levered firm is strictly smaller than that of the unlevered firm,
thereby implying that the former undertakes the project earlier than the latter.
In this paper, we have employed the standard real options model in which the state
variable follows a geometric Brownian motion. It is of great interest to see whether the
neutrality of debt in investment intensity is robust to alternative stochastic processes. For
example, Sarkar and Zapatero (2003) develop a trade-off model of capital structure with
mean reverting earnings (see also Sarkar 2003). They show that the scaling property no
longer holds even in the absence of any exogenous credit constraints. It is thus an interesting
extension to examine how debt financing affects a firm’s investment decisions in the context
of Sarkar and Zapatero (2003). We leave this challenge for future research.
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 3 The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the Lagrangian in Eq. (35) are
given by
{
(1− τ)
(
qLXLI
r − µ
)
− I ′(qL)qL
+[τ(α+ 1) + b(1− τ)α]
(
α
α+ 1
)α+1( r − µ
qLXLI
)α(CL
r
)α+1}(X0
XLI
)β
+λL
{
δI ′(qL)qL − [1 + τα+ b(1− τ)α]
(
α
α+ 1
)α+1( r − µ
qLXLI
)α(CL
r
)α+1}
= 0, (A.1)
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{
(1− τ)
(
qLXLI
r − µ
)
−
(
β
β − 1
)[
I(qL)−
τCL
r
]
−
(
α+ β
α
)[
τ(α+ 1) + b(1− τ)α
β − 1
](
α
α+ 1
)α+1( r − µ
qLXLI
)α(CL
r
)α+1}(X0
XLI
)β
+λL
[
1 + τα+ b(1− τ)α
β − 1
](
α
α + 1
)α+1( r − µ
qLXLI
)α(CL
r
)α+1
= 0, (A.2)
{
τ − [τ(α+ 1) + b(1− τ)α]
(
α
α+ 1
)α( r− µ
qLXLI
)α(CL
r
)α}(X0
XLI
)β
−λL
{
1− [1 + τα+ b(1− τ)α]
(
α
α + 1
)α( r − µ
qLXLI
)α(CL
r
)α}
= 0, (A.3)
and
λL
{
δI(qL)−
CL
r
+
[
1 + τα + b(1− τ)α
α+ 1
](
α
α+ 1
)α( r− µ
qLXLI
)α(CL
r
)α+1}
= 0, (A.4)
where (qL, XLI , C
L) is the solution to the optimization problem on the right-hand side of
Eq. (34), and λL ≥ 0 is the optimal Lagrange multiplier. If λL > 0, the exogenously given
credit constraint must be binding, as is evident from Eq. (A.4).
Multiplying CL/r to Eq. (A.3) and adding the resulting equation to Eq. (A.1) yields
[V (qL, XLI , C
L)− I ′(qL)qL]
(
X0
XLI
)β
+ λL
{
δI ′(qL)qL −
CL
r
+
[
1 + τα + b(1− τ)α
α+ 1
](
α
α+ 1
)α( r − µ
qLXLI
)α(CL
r
)α+1}
= 0, (A.5)
where we have used Eq. (35) for V (qL, XLI , C
L). Substituting Eq. (A.4) into Eq. (A.5)
yields Eq. (36). Multiplying CL/r(β − 1) to Eq. (A.3) and subtracting the resulting
equation from Eq. (A.2) yields
[
V (qL, XLI , C
L)−
(
β
β − 1
)
I(qL)
](
X0
XLI
)β
+
λL
β − 1
{
CL
r
−
[
1 + τα+ b(1− τ)α
α+ 1
](
α
α+ 1
)α( r − µ
qLXLI
)α(CL
r
)α+1}
= 0, (A.6)
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where we have used Eq. (35) for V (qL, XLI , C
L). Substituting Eq. (A.4) into Eq. (A.6)
yields Eq. (37). Subtracting Eq. (36) from Eq. (37) yields
[
1− λLδ
(
XLI
X0
)β][
I ′(qL)−
(
β
β − 1
)
I(qL)
qL
]
= 0. (A.7)
Define the following coupon payment:
Cˆ = r
(
α + 1
α
)[
τ
τ(α+ 1) + b(1− τ)α
]1/α(qLXLI
r − µ
)
. (A.8)
If we evaluate the left-hand side of Eq. (A.3) at CL = Cˆ, the left-hand side of Eq. (A.3)
becomes
−
λL(1− τ)[τ + b(1− τ)]α
τ(α+ 1) + b(1− τ)α
≤ 0, (A.9)
where the equality holds only when λL = 0, i.e., only when the credit constraint is not
binding. By the concavity of the optimization problem on the right-hand side of Eq. (34),
Eqs. (A.3) and (A.9) imply that CL = Cˆ if λL = 0 and CL < Cˆ if λL > 0. Hence, if λL > 0,
it follows from either Eq. (A.3) or Eq. (A.8) that
1− [1 + τα+ b(1− τ)α]
(
α
α + 1
)α( r − µ
qLXLI
)α(CL
r
)α
> 0. (A.10)
Eq. (A.3) implies that
[
τ
(
X0
XLI
)β
− λL
]{
1− [1 + τα+ b(1− τ)α]
(
α
α + 1
)α( r − µ
qLXLI
)α(CL
r
)α}
> 0. (A.11)
It follows from Eqs. (A.10) and (A.11) that λL < τ(X0/X
L
I )
β if λL > 0. Since 0 ≤ λL <
τ(X0/X
L
I )
β, we have λLδ < (X0/X
L
I )
β. Eq. (A.7) as such reduces to
I ′(qL) =
(
β
β − 1
)
I(qL)
qL
. (A.12)
It then follows from Eqs. (18) and (A.12) that qL = qU .
Multiplying CL/r to Eq. (A.3) and adding the resulting Substituting Eqs. (A.3) and
(A.4) into Eq. (A.2) yields
[
(1− τ)
(
qLXLI
r − µ
)
−
(
β
β − 1
)
I(qL) +
(
α
α+ 1
)
τCL
r
](
X0
XLI
)β
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+λL
[(
β
β − 1
)
δI(qL)−
(
α
α+ 1
)
CL
r
]
= 0. (A.13)
If λL > 0, Eqs. (A.4) and (A.10) imply that
δI(qL)−
(
α
α+ 1
)
CL
r
> 0. (A.14)
Eq. (A.13) implies that
XLI ≤
(
r − µ
1− τ
)[(
β
β − 1
)
I(qL)
qL
−
(
α
α+ 1
)
τCL
rqL
]
<
(
r − µ
1− τ
)(
β
β − 1
)
I(qU)
qU
= XUI , (A.15)
where the first inequality follows from the fact that λL ≥ 0 and Eq. (A.14) holds if λL > 0,
the second inequality follows from Eq. (A.3) that CL > 0 and qL = qU , and the equality
follows from Eq. (19). 2
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Table 1 Behavior of the firm facing the exogenously given credit constraint for different
values of the debt capacity
Debt Investment Investment Default Coupon Project Firm
capacity intensity trigger trigger payment NPV value
0 2.0551 2.4508 0 0 43.517 10.006
0.1 2.0551 2.4150 0.0426 0.2247 42.885 10.102
0.2 2.0551 2.3814 0.0862 0.4540 42.304 10.197
0.3 2.0551 2.3506 0.1308 0.6889 41.784 10.289
0.4 2.0551 2.3231 0.1766 0.9301 41.342 10.378
0.5 2.0551 2.2995 0.2238 1.1786 40.987 10.463
0.6 2.0551 2.2803 0.2725 1.4353 40.738 10.543
0.7 2.0551 2.2665 0.3229 1.7010 40.612 10.616
0.8 2.0551 2.2587 0.3752 1.9766 40.631 10.681
0.9 2.0551 2.2578 0.4296 2.2629 40.817 10.737
1 2.0551 2.2647 0.4861 2.5604 41.192 10.782
1.2885 2.0551 2.3342 0.6609 3.4816 43.517 10.839
The risk-neutral owner-managed firm has an option to invest in a project. The firm’s
investment decisions are characterized by the investment trigger, XI, at which the invest-
ment option is exercised, and by the investment intensity, q, according to the investment
cost function, I(q) = 10+ q4. At the investment instant, the firm has to choose the coupon
payment, C, to raise the amount, D(q, XI, C), from debt holders subject to the exogenously
given credit constraint, D(q, XI, C) ≤ δI(q), where δ ∈ [0, 1] is the debt capacity (i.e., the
maximum debt-to-asset ratio). The net present value of the project is V (q, XI, C) − I(q)
at the investment instant. The value of the firm is equal to the value of the investment
option at t = 0. The parameter values are as follows: the riskless rate of interest, r, is 8%;
the corporate income tax rate, τ , is 15%; the bankruptcy cost parameter, b, is 30%; and
the state variable, Xt, takes on the initial value, X0 = 1, with the annualized growth rate,
µ = 2%, and the annualized standard deviation, σ = 30%.
